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Abstract: How to avoid project failures driven by overoptimistic schedules? Managers often attempt 
to mitigate the duration underestimation and improve the accuracy of project schedules by providing 
their planners with excessively detailed project specifications. While this traditional approach may be 
intuitive, solely providing more detailed information has proven to have a limited effect on eliminating 
behavioral biases. We experimentally test the effectiveness of providing detailed specification and 
compare it to an alternative intervention of providing historical information about the average 
duration of similar projects in the past. We find that both interventions mitigate the underestimation 
bias. However, since providing detailed project specification results in high variance of estimation 
errors due to sizable over- and underestimates, only the provision of historical information leads to 
more accurate project duration estimates. We also test whether it is more effective to anchor planners 
by providing historical information simultaneously with the project specification or to provide the 
historical information only after beliefs regarding the project duration are formed, in which case 
planners can regress their initial estimates towards the historical average. We find that the timing of 
disclosing information does not play a role as the estimation bias is mitigated and the accuracy is 
improved in both conditions. Finally, we observe that the subjective confidence in the accuracy of 
duration estimates does not vary across the interventions, suggesting that the confidence is neither a 
function of the amount nor the detail of available information.  
 
Keywords: project management, project planning, duration estimation, historical information, project 
specification 
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1. Introduction 
A common feature of virtually all business projects is the uncertainty regarding the amount of time 
and resources needed to deliver expected outcomes. Proficient planning processes capable of 
generating adequate project plans are essential for executing a cost-benefit analysis and deciding 
which projects to initiate. Once a project is underway, a realistic project schedule is a crucial 
determinant of project success, ensuring effective allocation and utilization of resources in an 
organization. Accurate project duration estimates are especially important for project tasks or phases 
that lie on the critical path, with their timely completion being a necessary condition for delivering the 
entire project on time (Kelley, 1961). Precise schedules are also vital when managing a project 
portfolio, in which individual projects compete for temporary use of scarce resources. Delays in one 
project can slow down the progress of other projects within a portfolio that run in parallel and/or 
sequentially, resulting in increased costs and lower efficiency for the entire organization.  
 
The estimation of project duration appears to be a challenging undertaking as approximately 50 
percent of business projects are not delivered on time (Project Management Institute, 2019). The high 
failure rate begs a question of how to improve the accuracy of project duration estimates. In the 
current paper, we experimentally test the effectiveness of two interventions advocated by project 
management methodologies, namely providing a more detailed project specification and disclosing 
historical information regarding the average duration of similar projects in the past. We also examine 
the effect of timing at which the historical information is disclosed.  
 
Traditionally, a thorough project specification is perceived as a crucial determinant of estimation 
accuracy (Project Management Institute, 2013). Arguably no specification is extensive enough to 
capture every aspect of the requested deliverables, especially at early stages of a project when they 
are not yet developed to the full extent. Nevertheless, project managers often go to great lengths to 
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equip their planners with as detailed as possible descriptions of project tasks.  Project planners in turn 
intuitively tend to focus on the project specification at hand, failing to realize that it might be 
incomplete. By neglecting the unspecified (or unknown) details, project duration estimates may 
become understated.1 Kahneman (2011) refers to the phenomenon of paying attention only to the 
information one is presented with while ignoring the missing links as the “what you see is all there is” 
rule.  
 
Kahneman & Lovallo (1993) and Kahneman & Tversky (1977) suggest that the accuracy of project 
duration estimates can be improved by consulting historical information (also referred to as reference 
class information) regarding the actual duration of similar projects in the past. The main advantage of 
utilizing historical information in the planning process is that it naturally encompasses the impact of a 
variety of small obstacles (e.g., omissions in the project specification, misunderstandings of 
requirements, or unforeseen events) on project execution. The technique is also endorsed by project 
management methodologies (IPMA, 2015; Project Management Institute, 2013). However, the 
methodologies suggest consulting the duration (or costs) of previous projects only in the absence of 
detailed information regarding the current project. Advocating for the use of this technique more 
broadly, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that although historical information may fail to predict extreme 
project outcomes, it commonly induces more accurate estimates compared to a more conventional 
planning based on project specification, which he describes as “the road to inaccuracy”.  
 
Although the practicality of historical information is recognized in project management 
methodologies, its effect has not yet been tested in a controlled environment and with real incentives. 
 
1  Although the current paper focuses on underestimation caused by incomplete project specification, it is 
important to keep in mind that there are multiple other factors contributing to inaccurate project duration 
estimates, such as overoptimism, misrepresentation driven by strategic incentives, competence signaling, using 
deadlines as commitment devices or unintended anchoring effects. 
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Lorko, Servátka, & Zhang (2019) provide preliminary evidence that planners could benefit from 
considering past project duration in the planning process. In an environment where subjects estimate 
how long it will take to complete a simple real-effort task, more than two thirds of them would be 
better off in terms of estimation accuracy if the historical average was used for estimation purposes 
instead of their own estimate. A similar finding can be found in the demand forecasting literature (see 
Goodwin, Moritz, & Siemsen, 2019, for a comprehensive review).2  
 
In the current paper, we study the impact of historical information directly and compare its 
effectiveness with the impact of providing a more detailed task description. We investigate the effects 
of our interventions on two outcomes: the estimation bias, which we measure as a relative (signed) 
estimation error (i.e., estimate – actual task duration), and the estimation accuracy, which we 
measure as an absolute estimation error (i.e., |estimate – actual duration|). To allow for causal 
inference, we create a stylized laboratory environment with a project to be undertaken and carefully 
manipulate the information our subjects have at their disposal. For both interventions, we deliberately 
provide only a single piece of additional information, eliciting the lower bound of each effect. This 
conservative design feature is essential for drawing inference about the relative strength of the 
interventions.  Our experimental design controls for confounding factors such as the quality of project 
deliverables, project costs, risks and unforeseen events, all of which may interfere with the project 
progress and affect the estimation accuracy in business practice.  
 
In the experiment, we first test whether anchoring planners on reliable historical information 
(operationalized as the average task duration in the past) prior to estimation mitigates the estimation 
 
2 While demand forecasting differs from project planning in that the actual demand is independent of one’s own 
actions, the prediction of future demand by statistical software still outperforms adjusted expert predictions 
(Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009) most of the time. This result seems to be driven by 
individuals placing more weight on current observables and neglecting longer horizon outcomes (Kremer, 
Moritz, & Siemsen, 2011; Massey & Wu, 2005). 
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bias and improves the estimation accuracy. We then switch off the anchoring effect by disclosing 
historical information only after the initial estimate has already been made. 3  We test whether 
individuals regress their estimates towards the historical average and whether this approach is more 
effective than making the information available alongside the project specification. Finally, we test 
whether the estimation bias can be mitigated and estimation accuracy improved also by estimating 
from a more detailed project specification. By linking the interventions together through a common 
baseline treatment, we are able to directly compare whether providing historical information is more 
effective than providing a more detailed specification. We conjecture that estimates incorporating 
historical information outperform, in terms of their accuracy, not only estimates based on a crude 
(incomplete) specification, but also estimates based on a detailed specification.  
 
After testing our main hypotheses, we explore the mechanism that can encourage planners to seek 
out and utilize historical information in the estimation process. We elicit the (non-incentivized) 
willingness to pay for historical information when the benefits have already been experienced by 
witnessing the improvement in own estimates. We then contrast it with a situation when the 
information was not provided, and its value is therefore less obvious. For both interventions, we also 
examine whether the available information reflects on subjective confidence in estimates, measured 
by a Likert scale. Although intuitively one might expect to find a positive correlation, according to 
Kahneman's (2011) “what you see is all there is” rule, planners neglect the missing elements in project 
specifications. As a result, they may not be able to differentiate between various degrees of ambiguity 
embedded in alternative specifications of the same project. Planners equipped with less information 
or less detailed project specifications can thus produce less accurate, but not necessarily less confident 
duration estimates.  
 
3 Previous research shows that anchoring can introduce a bias in estimation if irrelevant information is presented 
(Lorko et al., 2019; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The current study utilizes anchoring as a debiasing technique 
by nudging the estimates towards the average duration of similar projects in the past. 
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Our results support the conjecture that disclosing historical information can mitigate the estimation 
bias and improve the estimation accuracy, regardless of whether the information is provided together 
with the task description or after the initial estimation. We find that while a more detailed task 
description reduces both the frequency and the extent of duration underestimation, it induces a larger 
variance in individual estimates. The estimates are on average unbiased, but the estimation accuracy 
does not improve compared to the baseline accuracy and is significantly worse than the accuracy 
when historical information is provided. We also find that the willingness to pay for historical 
information (weakly) increases after witnessing that the information improves the estimates. Finally, 
in line with “what you see is all there is” rule, we find that subjective confidence in estimates is similar 
across all treatments and thus does not depend on available information. Subjects do not account for 
the possibility of missing critical details and exhibit high confidence in their estimates regardless of 
what they know about the task. 
 
Our study provides the following implications for project management practitioners. First, if 
information regarding similar projects in the past is available, project managers should consider 
utilizing the average duration of projects from the reference class as a “helpful anchor” for their 
planners. Providing historical information is more effective than the more traditional approach of 
providing detailed project specification. Second, project managers can expect initial resistance of 
planners to embrace historical information, because planners may not realize its usefulness before 
experiencing its benefits. Third, confidence in estimates does not correlate with estimation accuracy 
and project managers should be cautious when making decisions based on the planner’s confidence 
in the proposed project schedule. 
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2. Relationship to the literature 
While both underestimated and overestimated project schedules imply negative consequences for 
project stakeholders, businesses appear to perceive underestimation as a more serious issue. The 
overwhelming focus on underestimation might be driven by the asymmetry of consequences. Direct 
costs stemming from underestimation are more salient than opportunity costs of underutilized 
resources arising from overestimation. Moreover, if members of a project team identify instances of 
overestimation in the project, they can strategically “waste” the allocated time and utilize other 
resources anyway, so the estimation error may go unnoticed.  
 
In academic research, underestimation has also attracted more attention than overestimation. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1977) coin the term “planning fallacy,” which is a tendency to make 
overoptimistic plans and forecasts that are close to the best-case scenarios, while ignoring evidence 
from past projects that took significantly longer to complete. The underestimation of required 
resources is pervasive in public works (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2006; Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002) and 
also in business projects (Project Management Institute, 2019). Misestimation can often be attributed 
to strategic incentives, e.g., gathering political support for the proposed project (Flyvbjerg, 2008). 
However, a review of psychological studies by Buehler, Griffin, & Peetz (2010) as well as a 
comprehensive review of empirical duration estimation studies, laboratory and field experiments by 
Halkjelsvik & Jørgensen (2012) reveal a frequent tendency to underestimate the duration even if there 
are little or no incentives to manipulate the forecasts. From this perspective, the planning fallacy can 
be considered an instance of a general optimism bias (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). Extant research 
(see Grushka-Cockayne et al., 2018, for a review) identifies several techniques to mitigate the planning 
fallacy, such as unpacking/decomposing a project into subtasks (Connolly & Dean, 1997; Forsyth & 
Burt, 2008; Kruger & Evans, 2004), using predictions by observers instead of self-predictions (Newby-
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Clark, Ross, Koehler, Buehler, & Griffin, 2000), or averaging independent estimates from a large group 
of individuals (Eubanks, Read, & Grushka-Cockayne, 2015). 
 
The current paper explores whether the planning fallacy can be mitigated by estimating from a more 
detailed project specification and by regressing the estimates towards the average duration of past 
projects. 4  Kahneman & Tversky (1977) offer a corrective procedure for generating regressive 
estimates.5 They propose that planners first select a meaningful reference class for their forecast and 
then assess the distribution of outcomes, in particular, the average. These steps are followed by 
intuitive estimation of the problem at hand and assessment of predictability, i.e., the degree to which 
the available historical information permits accurate estimation. In the final step of the procedure, 
the intuitive estimate is adjusted towards the reference class average.  
 
Interestingly, the procedure for producing regressive estimates has not received much empirical 
attention and testing. Two notable studies include a field experiment focusing on casual daily activities 
(Roy, Mitten, & Christenfeld, 2008; Experiment 3) and a framed classroom experiment concerning 
software development effort estimation (Shmueli, Pliskin, & Fink, 2016). Both studies report improved 
estimation accuracy when the reference class averages are supplied. However, Roy et al., (2008) 
employ tasks the duration of which is often beyond the participants’ control while Shmueli et al., 
(2016) rely only on the predicted accuracy rather than the actual one, as the tasks are not performed 
after the estimation. Also, subjects in neither study are incentivized, possibly resulting in the 
hypothetical bias (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Moreover, in both studies, historical information is 
given to participants together with the task description. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to 
 
4 The idea  is based on a statistical regression towards the mean (Nesselroade, Stigler, & Baltes, 1980) and applies 
to not only underestimation, but also overestimation of necessary project resources, including time. 
5 Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, & Buhl (2005) later shorten the procedure and call it “Reference Class Forecasting”. 
Reference class forecasting was later endorsed by the American Planning Association, which encouraged 
planners to use it complementary to more traditional estimating methods (Flyvbjerg, 2008). 
9 
 
distinguish whether the differences in estimates across treatments are subject to the anchoring effect 
(König, 2005; Lorko et al., 2019; Thomas & Handley, 2008) or whether the regression of the initial 
intuitive estimate towards the reference class average actually takes place.  
 
In this paper, we present the results of a controlled incentivized experiment in which the reference 
class is a group of subjects from the baseline treatment. We calculate the average actual task duration 
in our reference class and then provide this average to subjects in subsequent treatments as historical 
information. We investigate whether they use this information to improve their estimation accuracy. 
Unlike in previous studies, the individual estimating the duration of the task is also the one who 
executes the task. This feature allows us to recreate incentives faced within a business project. In 
addition, by carefully manipulating the timing when the historical information is disclosed, we 
separate the anchoring effect from the regression effect. Furthermore, we examine whether the 
accuracy can be improved by a traditional approach of providing more detailed project specification 
and compare the effectiveness of detailed specification against historical information. While providing 
detailed project specification is endorsed by project management methodologies (IPMA, 2015; Project 
Management Institute, 2013), we are not aware of any study in the area of duration estimation that 
tests the effectiveness of such approach, let alone compares it against other interventions.  
 
3. Experimental design  
In our experiment, we test whether (i) disclosing historical information and (ii) providing a more 
detailed task specification can induce more accurate and less biased duration estimates. The 
experiment consists of four treatments, implemented in an across-subject design: Baseline, 
Information Before Estimate (henceforth “Info-Before”), Information After Estimate (henceforth 
“Info-After”), and Detailed Description.  
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The experimental task 
We employ a modified version of the individual task introduced by Mazar, Amir, & Ariely (2008), in 
which subjects search for two numbers that add up to 10 in matrices containing decimal numbers. 
Each matrix has only one correct answer. Instead of the original twelve numbers within each matrix, 
we use sixteen numbers, making the task more difficult and taking longer to complete. For the same 
reason, we make the target sum to be 100 as opposed to 10. A sample matrix is provided in the 
appendix. Subjects first estimate the total time (in minutes and seconds) it will take them to find 
correct answers for all 10 matrices together, before they search through the matrices one by one.  
 
The instructions describe the task as follows: “You will be shown 10 matrices one by one. Each matrix 
contains 16 numbers. Two of those numbers add up to exactly 100. You will have to identify those two 
numbers. You will move on to the next matrix only after you submit the correct answer.” In the task 
description, we intentionally omit the information that numbers in matrices are decimal. Since people 
do not usually think of decimals when being confronted with the word “number”, the omission in the 
specification makes the task look easier than it really is, creating a discrepancy between the intuitive 
estimate and the actual task duration. The discrepancy provides an adequately calibrated 
environment that is crucial for testing the effectiveness of factors capable of mitigating the estimation 
bias and improving the accuracy of duration estimates.  
 
Treatments 
In the Baseline treatment, no historical information is provided. Subjects read the instructions with 
the description of the experimental task and then estimate how much time they would need to 
complete it. Subsequently they indicate their subjective confidence in the accuracy of the estimate on 
a Likert scale and execute the task. Upon completion of the task, subjects complete an incentivized 
risk attitude assessment (Holt & Laury, 2002) as well as a demographics questionnaire. 
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In the Info-Before and Info-After treatments, subjects also receive information about the average 
actual task duration recorded in the Baseline treatment (18 minutes and 13 seconds). We 
operationalize the historical information as a single data point, in order to be able to draw a clear 
inference regarding the adjustment of the estimate towards the average. This would not be the case 
if the whole distribution was provided because one could not attribute the effect to a particular 
information from the distribution. In addition, it is arguably easier to interpret information conveyed 
as a simple average compared to a whole distribution of outcomes.   
 
In the Info-Before treatment, the historical information is disclosed before the estimation. In contrast, 
in the Info-After treatment, subjects receive the information only after they have provided their 
estimate and confidence rating. Once the historical information is disclosed, subjects in the Info-After 
treatment are given an opportunity to revise their estimate and confidence rating. To calculate the 
earnings, we use the revised estimate, as explained in the on-screen instructions. 
 
In the Detailed Description treatment, we provide subjects with a more informative task description. 
In particular, subjects are shown a sample matrix in the instructions and thus are aware that numbers 
in matrices are decimal. We explicitly mark the correct answer inside the sample matrix to prevent 
subjects from practicing the task and learning how much time it takes them to find the correct answer.  
 
Incentives 
We financially incentivize subjects for their estimation accuracy as well as task performance, 
motivating them to provide accurate task duration estimates, and at the same time to execute the 
task fast and avoid mistakes. By providing incentives for both accuracy and performance, we create 
an environment similar to duration estimation in business practice, in which it is not only the project 
schedule accuracy that counts, but also the speed of project delivery. The earning functions are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Estimation accuracy incentives follow a linear scoring rule, in which the earnings depend on the 
absolute difference between the actual task duration and the estimate. The earnings peak at AUD 18 
for a spot-on estimate and decrease by AUD 2.40 for every minute (i.e., 4 cents for every second) the 
estimate differs from the actual task duration, as shown in Equation (1). An equal penalization in both 
directions instead of, say, heavier penalty for being late, discourages undesirable strategic behavior, 
such as inflating estimates to minimize chances of not finishing “on time”. If the difference between 
the estimated and actual time is larger than 7.5 minutes (450 seconds), we set the estimation accuracy 
earnings to 0 to avoid negative earnings.6  Note that our experimental setting is similar to what 
planners often experience in business practice – while accurate estimates leading to successful project 
completion are commonly rewarded, planners are typically not punished if their estimates are 
inaccurate.  
Estimation accuracy earnings = 18 −  0.04 ∗ |actual task duration in seconds − estimated duration in seconds|   (1) 
The task performance earnings are calculated based on the actual task duration and on the count of 
correct (being always equal to 10) and incorrect answers, as shown in Equation (2). The faster the task 
execution and the fewer mistakes, the higher the earnings. Penalizing subjects for incorrect answers 
disincentivizes random clicking, guessing, or systematic trying of all combinations. An incentive 
structure that encourages not only speed but also quality parallels incentives encountered in business 
situations. We expected subjects to complete the task in 15 minutes (900 seconds) on average. 
 
6  We derived the 450-second threshold from the median task duration observed in pilot experiments 
(approximately 900 seconds). Since the instructions provide only a crude task description, we opted to set the 
threshold at the level of so-called “Rough Order of Magnitude” estimate, used in the initial project stages when 
the exact project scope is not yet fully developed. The project management methodology (Project Management 
Institute, 2013) for duration estimation requires the Rough Order of Magnitude estimates to fall in the range of 
+75%/-25% from the actual duration. Since our estimation accuracy earnings are symmetric for underestimation 
and overestimation, we implemented a range of +/-50%. 
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Without incorrect answers, the expected pace would earn subjects AUD 10 for their task performance, 
making the earnings from task performance comparable with the expected estimation accuracy 
earnings. We reward task performance separately instead of incorporating the performance and 
estimation accuracy together into one payoff function, because it is easier to understand for subjects 
and also because it preserves the motivation to continue performing the task even if the subject 
realizes that his estimate was too low and his estimation accuracy earnings will likely be zero. 
Task performance earnings = 300∗(3∗number of correct answers−number of incorrect answers)actual task duration in seconds    (2) 
 
Figure 1: Earning functions 
Notes: Figure 1 illustrates the earning functions for the scenario of estimate being 900 seconds, which is what 
we expected the representative task duration to be. Incidentally, the median actual task duration across all 
subjects participating in the experiment turned out to be 906 seconds (see Table 1 for the breakdown according 
to treatments). The highest earnings (resulting from finishing the task in exactly 900 seconds while making no 
mistakes) in this scenario yield AUD 28, with AUD 18 being for estimation accuracy and AUD 10 for task 
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performance. Note that given the slope of the task performance earnings function, a subject in this scenario 
could earn more than AUD 28 solely for task performance, by finishing the task in 321 seconds or less; however, 
the fastest recorded actual task duration in the experiment was 361 seconds.  
 
Since there are two types of incentives, there is a possibility that subjects might construct an earnings 
portfolio (Cox & Sadiraj, 2018). Although the portfolio effect can be controlled for by randomly 
selecting only one type of incentives for payment (Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt, 2015; Holt, 1986), we opt 
to preserve the parallelism and minimize the likelihood of portfolio effect by a careful experimental 
design. Our procedures (described below in detail) ensure that subjects are neither able to keep track 
of the elapsed time nor are provided with the number of matrices already solved, making it difficult 
to submit strategic estimates and control their working pace (Lorko, Servátka, & Zhang, 2020). The 
design of the incentive structure is similar to the one used in Lorko et al., (2019), where no evidence 
of the portfolio effect is found.  
 
Procedures 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the MGSM 
Vernon L. Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory at the Macquarie Graduate School of 
Management in Sydney. Subjects, consisting mostly of undergraduate business major students and 
MBAs, were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Before the start of the experiment, subjects sitting 
in individual cubicles were asked to put away their watches, mobile phones and any other devices 
displaying time, to prevent them from measuring the elapsed time. The laboratory premises did not 
contain any devices that show time. The clocks on computer monitors were hidden. After reading the 
instructions, subjects were given a few minutes to ask questions regarding the experiment. Once all 
questions were privately answered by the experimenter, the experiment proceeded to the decision-
making part. At the end of the experiment, subjects privately received their experimental earnings in 
cash in the control room at the back of the laboratory. 
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4. Hypotheses 
Historical information 
Since we deliberately describe the task in a way that it appears relatively easy to complete, we 
hypothesize that subjects in the Baseline treatment will underestimate its duration. We hypothesize 
that the underestimation will be mitigated by the historical information in the Info-Before and Info-
After treatments. We further conjecture that estimates in the Info-Before treatment will be more 
accurate than the revised estimates in the Info-After treatment. It is conceivable that in the Info-After 
treatment, subjects may be reluctant to fully incorporate the historical information in their estimation 
due to cognitive dissonance or the cost of cognitive effort. The adjustment of the initial estimate 
towards the historical information might thus be insufficient. Therefore, we expect to find unbiased 
estimates that are similar to the actual task duration and no systematic tendency to underestimate or 
overestimate the task duration in the Info-Before treatment but not necessarily in the Info-After 
treatment. 
• Hypothesis 1 
o Estimates BASELINE < Duration BASELINE 
o Estimates INFO-AFTER < Duration INFO-AFTER 
o Estimates INFO-BEFORE = Duration INFO-BEFORE 
o Estimates BASELINE < Estimates INFO-AFTER < Estimates INFO-BEFORE 
Since we incentivize subjects in all treatments for their estimation accuracy as well as task 
performance, we hypothesize that there will be no differences in the distributions of the actual 
duration across our treatments, akin to earlier findings (Lorko et al., 2019). In combination with the 
conjectured differences in estimates, we hypothesize that the Baseline treatment will result in the 
largest estimation bias and the lowest estimation accuracy. 
• Hypothesis 2 
o Duration BASELINE = Duration INFO-AFTER = Duration INFO-BEFORE 
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o Accuracy BASELINE < Accuracy INFO-AFTER < Accuracy INFO-BEFORE 
o Bias BASELINE > Bias INFO-AFTER > Bias INFO-BEFORE 
Detailed description 
Due to the omission in the task description that leads subjects to expect integer numbers in the 
matrices, the task seems easier in the Baseline treatment compared to the Detailed Description 
treatment. We therefore hypothesize to find significantly higher (and hence less understated) 
estimates in the Detailed Description treatment than in the Baseline treatment.  
• Hypothesis 3 
o Estimates BASELINE < Estimates DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Since we also expect no significant differences in the distributions of actual task duration across 
treatments (in parallel to Hypothesis 2), we conjecture that subjects in the Detailed Description 
treatment will provide less biased and more accurate duration estimates than subjects in the Baseline 
treatment. 
• Hypothesis 4 
o Duration BASELINE = Duration DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
o Accuracy BASELINE < Accuracy DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
o Bias BASELINE > Bias DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
 
 
5. Main results 
A total of 139 subjects, randomly assigned into our four treatments, participated in the experiment. 
However, 9 of those subjects (5 in Baseline, 1 in Info-After, 1 in Info-Before, and 2 in Detailed 
Description) found the task too difficult and gave up before completing the experiment. We thus 
analyze only the behavior of the remaining 130 subjects (59 females) with a mean age of 22.7 a 
standard deviation of 4.2 years. Of these subjects, 38 participated in the Baseline treatment, 29 in the 
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Info-After treatment, 29 in the Info-Before treatment and 34 in the Detailed Description treatment. 
We opted for a larger sample size in the Baseline treatment, in order to obtain a more robust average 
task duration. On average, subjects spent 50 minutes in the laboratory and earned AUD 17.20. The 
summary statistics are presented in Table 1. For the Info-After treatment, we present both the initial 
estimates elicited before the provision of the historical information, as well as the revised estimates 
that were elicited after the historical average was disclosed to subjects. Unless specifically stated, we 
use the revised estimates for testing the treatment effects. The results of treatment effects are 
presented in Table 2, while the individual-level data are graphically displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics (data in seconds) 
Treatments 
 
Baseline  
(N = 38) 
Info-After  
(N = 29) 
Info-Before  
(N = 29) 
Detailed Desc. 
(N = 34) 
 Initial est. Revised est.   
Estimates 
Means (SD) 601 (704) 456 (427) 814 (377) 798 (329) 1149 (1287) 
Medians 270 300 900 900 525 
Actual 
duration 
Means (SD) 1093 (573) 986 (528) 914 (404) 1144 (565) 
Medians 919 847 818 1017 
Bias 
Means (SD) -492 (757)  -171 (521) -115 (365) 5 (1369) 
Medians -539  -164 -68 -211 
Accuracy 
(Absolute 
error) 
Means (SD) 725 (530)  425 (338) 275 (262) 1012 (904) 
Medians 682  412 184 734 
Notes: SD refers to standard deviation. The bias is calculated as a relative estimation error (= Estimate – Actual duration) 
averaged across subjects, while the (in)accuracy is measured as the absolute value of the estimation error (= |Estimate – 
Actual duration|) averaged across subjects.  
 
Historical information 
Recall that the subjects in the Info-Before treatment received information about the historical average 
before their initial estimation, while the subjects in the Baseline treatment received no such 
information. As a result, we find significantly higher estimates in the Info-Before treatment than in 
the Baseline treatment (Mann-Whitney test, henceforth “M-W”, p <0.01). On the other hand, the 
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subjects in the Info-After treatment were given identical instructions before their initial estimation as 
the subjects in the Baseline treatment and were not provided with any historical information at first. 
Unsurprisingly, subjects in the Info-After treatment provide similar estimates as the subjects in the 
Baseline treatment (M-W, p = 0.98), with the median estimate being 270 seconds in Baseline and 300 
seconds in Info-After. However, upon disclosing the historical information, estimates in the Info-After 
treatment significantly increase (with the median being 900 seconds), as the subjects adjust their 
initial beliefs towards the historical average (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p <0.01). 
These revised estimates are significantly higher than the estimates in the Baseline treatment (M-W, p 
<0.01) and similar to the estimates in the Info-Before treatment (M-W, p = 0.73). As for the task 
execution, we do not find differences in the actual task duration or in the number of incorrect answers 
across the three treatments, resulting in similar task performance earnings. 
 
Table 2:  Treatment effects (p-values of the Mann-Whitney tests) 
 Baseline vs.  
Info-After 
Baseline vs.  
Info-Before 
Info-After vs.  
Info-Before 
Baseline vs. 
Detailed Description 
Estimates <0.01 <0.01 0.73 0.049 
Actual 
duration  
0.29 0.21 0.71 0.66 
Bias  0.02 <0.01 0.76 0.04 
Absolute 
error  
<0.01 <0.01 0.09 0.33 
 
Result 1: The estimates in the Baseline treatment are significantly lower than the estimates in both 
treatments with historical information. The timing when the information is provided does not 
influence the estimates. The actual task duration does not differ across the three treatments.  
 
Our data also provide support for Hypothesis 2, which states that subjects in the Baseline treatment 
are more likely to underestimate the time necessary to complete the task, resulting in the largest 
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estimation bias and the lowest accuracy. As predicted, the subjects in the Info-Before treatment 
exhibit the smallest bias and the highest accuracy. Nevertheless, treatment effects regarding the 
estimation bias and accuracy parallel our previous results with the bias being significantly larger and 
the accuracy significantly lower in the Baseline treatment than in both the Info-Before and Info-After 
treatments. We do not find significant differences in bias and accuracy between the Info-After 
treatment and the Info-Before treatment.  
 
Out of 58 subjects pooled from the two treatments with historical information, 49 subjects (84%) 
provided an estimate lower than the historical average, and 9 subjects (16%) provided a higher 
estimate. While this might resemble overconfidence, we note that the distribution of virtually any task 
duration is typically skewed to the right, meaning that over 50% of outcomes are lower than the 
average (in our Baseline treatment, it is 63%). In the two treatments with historical information, we 
find a significant positive correlation between the estimates and the actual task duration (Pearson 
correlation, r = 0.43, p < 0.01 for pooled data), suggesting that subjects have relatively well calibrated 
expectations of their own performance when the historical average is available. We do not find a 
significant correlation between the estimates and the actual task duration in the Baseline treatment 
(nor in the Detailed Description treatment). 
 
Result 2: The estimates in the Baseline treatment exhibit the largest estimation bias and the lowest 
estimation accuracy. Providing historical information in the Info-After and Info-Before treatments 
decreases the bias (resulting in less underestimation) and improves the accuracy. 
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Figure 2: Individual-level estimates and the actual task duration 
Notes: Figure 2 displays scatter plots of individual-level estimates (vertical axis) and actual duration (horizontal 
axis), by treatments. Precise estimates are on the red 45-degree line. Any dot above the red line indicates 
overestimation, while a dot below the red line indicates underestimation. The green line represents the Lowess 
smoothing of estimates on actual duration with the weight of running-line least squares. For presentational 
clarity purposes, 9 outliers were removed (4 subjects from Baseline, 1 from Info-After, 1 from Info-Before, and 
1 from Detailed Description who spent more than 3000 seconds to complete the task, and 2 subjects from 
Detailed Description whose estimates were higher than 3000 seconds). 
 
 
Detailed description 
Next, we compare the behavior in the Baseline treatment to the behavior in the Detailed Description 
treatment. In line with our Hypothesis 3, the estimates in the Detailed Description treatment are on 
average almost two times higher than in the Baseline treatment, with the difference being statistically 
significant (M-W, p = 0.049). The actual task duration does not differ between the two treatments (M-
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W, p = 0.66), and the same holds for the number of incorrect answers and hence also for the task 
performance earnings. 
 
The subjects in the Detailed Description treatment exhibit a mean estimation bias of only 5 seconds, 
which is significantly lower than in the Baseline treatment (M-W, p = 0.04). However, the small bias 
itself does not necessarily imply high estimation accuracy, which depends on the severity of over- and 
underestimates. In the Detailed Description treatment, we find a large variance in estimates, which 
range from a couple of minutes to almost 2 hours (individual-level data are displayed in Figure 2). 
Although the subjects provide unbiased estimates on average, their estimation accuracy appears 
slightly lower than in the Baseline treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant (M-W, p 
= 0.33). Our Hypothesis 4, stating that providing a more detailed description leads to less biased and 
more accurate estimates is supported only partially. Interestingly, we also find that it takes on average 
48 seconds for the subjects in the Detailed Description treatment to provide their estimates, which is 
10-17 seconds longer than in any other treatment. The difference is weakly statistically significant 
compared to the Baseline treatment (M-W, p = 0.06). The result indicates that subjects might have 
hard time to grasp the complexity of the task based on the detailed description, resulting in large 
estimation errors.  
Result 3: Providing a more detailed task description mitigates the underestimation bias but does not 
improve the estimation accuracy.  
 
 
6. What to provide: historical information or a more detailed description? 
The common Baseline treatment allows us to directly compare the effect of the two implemented 
interventions. We find that both providing historical information and providing a more detailed task 
description mitigates the underestimation of the time necessary to complete the task. Compared to 
the Baseline, the estimation bias is significantly reduced in the Info-Before treatment (M-W, p <0.01), 
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the Info-After treatment (M-W, p = 0.02) as well as in the Detailed Description treatment (M-W, p = 
0.04). In contrast, we find a similar estimation bias in all comparisons across the three treatments with 
an intervention (M-W, p = 0.76 for the Info-Before vs. Info-After comparison, 0.76 for Info-Before vs. 
Detailed Description, and 0.84 for Info-After vs. Detailed Description).  
 
Regarding the estimation accuracy, we find that the historical information intervention is effective, 
while the detailed description intervention is not. The absolute estimation error is reduced (against 
the Baseline) in the Info-Before treatment (M-W, p <0.01) and the Info-After treatment (M-W, p 
<0.01), but not in the Detailed Description treatment (M-W, p = 0.33). Furthermore, we find no 
statistically significant differences in the estimation accuracy between the Info-Before and the Info-
After treatments (M-W, p = 0.09). We do, however, find that subjects in the Detailed Description 
treatment are less accurate than subjects in both the Info-Before treatment (M-W, p <0.01) and the 
Info-After treatment (M-W, p <0.01). Thus, in terms of the estimation accuracy, the effect of historical 
information significantly outperforms the effect of more detailed task description. 
 
Result 4:  Providing historical information as well as providing detailed task description significantly 
reduces the underestimation bias. However, only the provision of historical information also 
significantly improves the estimation accuracy. 
 
Robustness 
To verify the robustness of the effect of our interventions, we conduct a regression analysis, 
controlling for risk attitudes, time spent on estimation, time spent on indicating confidence, subjective 
confidence in own estimate, and demographics (age, gender, education, employment status and self-
reported math skill). The regression results (presented in the appendix, Table 4) are consistent with 
non-parametric tests presented earlier. In particular, we find that both our interventions are 
associated with higher and thus less biased estimates, but only the provision of historical information 
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significantly improves the estimation accuracy. Again, we find no effect of any intervention on the 
actual task duration. Furthermore, we find that higher confidence is associated with lower estimates 
but has no effect on the actual task duration and estimation accuracy. Finally, we find a significant 
negative correlation between the self-reported math skill and the actual task duration. This 
observation is in contrast with Mazar et al. (2008, p. 636) claim that subjects “did not view this task as 
one that reflected their math ability or intelligence”. However, we note that our subjects self-reported 
their math skill after they finished the task, at which point they may have felt how good their 
performance was, possibly reversing the causality. 
 
7. Subjective confidence in estimates and willingness to pay  
Are people able to differentiate between various degrees of ambiguity embedded in different 
specifications of the same project? And how valuable do they perceive the historical information to 
be? To provide additional behavioral insights, we analyze the elicited subjective confidence in 
estimates and willingness to pay for historical information across all four treatments.  
 
Subjective confidence in estimates 
Intuitively, estimates based on a more detailed task description, or supported by historical 
information, could be produced with higher confidence. Thus, one might expect subjects in the 
Baseline treatment to be less confident in their estimates than in any other treatment. However, our 
across-subject design makes it difficult for subjects to realize that some essential information might 
be missing. Hence, the “what you see is all there is” rule predicts subjects to focus only on the tangible 
information and remain unaware of what they do not know, resulting in similarly high confidence in 
estimates in all treatments. To test the rule of “what you see is all there is”, we asked subjects to 
indicate their subjective confidence in the accuracy of their estimate on a 5-point Likert scale. In 
particular, subjects filled in the sentence “I am ....... that my estimate will be accurate,” with either 
very confident (with the assigned value of 5), confident (4), neither confident nor unconfident (3), 
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unconfident (2), or very unconfident (1). Subjects were informed that the answer to this question was 
not payoff relevant.   
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the subjective confidence in estimates 
Treatments 
 
Baseline  
(N = 38) 
Info-After  
(N = 29) 
Info-Before  
(N = 29) 
Detailed Description 
(N = 34) 
 Initial est. Revised est.   
Mean confidence (SD) 3.7 (0.8) 3.5 (0.7) 3.8 (0.7) 3.7 (0.8) 3.5 (0.9) 
Median confidence  4 4 4 4 4 
Notes: SD refers to standard deviation.  
 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3. The subjective confidence in estimates is similar across 
all treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.52). In general, subjects report relatively high confidence in 
their estimates, as the median confidence in all treatments is 4 out of the maximum of 5, which 
supports the “what you see is all there is” rule. Subjects display similar confidence in estimates 
irrespectively of whether they received historical information prior to the estimation, and also 
irrespectively of how detailed the task description was. Importantly, the confidence in estimates does 
not significantly correlate with estimation inaccuracy (errors) in any treatment. For pooled data, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient yields r = -0.1, and p = 0.27. 
 
Result 5: Subjective confidence in estimates is not affected by the amount or detail of available 
information. Subjects display similar level of confidence regardless of what they know about the task. 
 
Willingness to pay for historical information 
Finally, to investigate whether individuals recognize the importance of historical information, we 
analyze responses to the non-incentivized willingness-to-pay question asked at the end of the 
experiment. In the Info-After treatment and the Info-Before treatment, we asked subjects to consider 
that historical information was not given for free and requested to state the maximum amount they 
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would be willing to pay in order to obtain such information. In the Baseline treatment and the Detailed 
Description treatment, we asked subjects to consider that there was historical information available 
before the estimation and state the maximum amount they would be willing to pay for it. From the 
analysis we eliminated subjects who stated that they would be willing to pay more than AUD 18, which 
was the threshold of the maximum attainable earnings from the estimation accuracy. The median 
willingness-to-pay is AUD 5.00 (the average is AUD 5.45) in treatments with historical information 
(pooled Info-Before and Info-After) and AUD 3.00 (AUD 3.53) in treatments without historical 
information (pooled Baseline and Detailed Description). The difference in willingness-to-pay is weakly 
statistically significant (M-W, p = 0.06). With this caveat, we speculate that the subjects in treatments 
with historical information are willing to pay more because they have experienced the benefits of the 
information.7  
 
We also report an interesting observation.  Subjects in treatments with historical information earn on 
average AUD 4.81 more for their estimation accuracy than subjects in treatments without historical 
information. These “additional” accuracy earnings are similar to the median amount of AUD 5.00 that 
the subjects in treatments with historical information are willing to pay for the information. While this 
result might be due to chance, it points out that although the historical information is costly, it often 
has positive return on investment and that people who have actually used the historical information 
are more aware of what it is worth.  
 
8. Discussion 
An adequate business project schedule is essential for project success and plays a key role in effective 
allocation and utilization of resources in an organization. In this paper, we investigate the 
effectiveness of two interventions designed to induce more accurate duration estimates within the 
 
7 We note that the difference is not significant if we include the eliminated subjects. 
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project planning process: providing historical information and providing a more detailed project 
specification. In the task description, we deliberately omit important information regarding the 
decimal format of numbers in matrices, making the task appear easier to complete than it really is. 
This creates a large gap between the intuitive estimate and the time necessary to complete the task. 
We show that the utilization of historical information in the planning process can significantly mitigate 
the underestimation bias and improve the estimation accuracy. We further find that the timing when 
the information is provided does not play a role in our experimental setting. We note, however, that 
the timing might matter in the business practice, where producing initial estimates may be associated 
with making a commitment towards co-workers or managers. Subsequent adjustment of initial 
estimates towards historical averages may be seen as poor competence of the planner. 
 
One could argue that not disclosing crucial information regarding the nature of the task makes its 
description perhaps too uninformative. While it is possible, we note that virtually any project 
specification is a simplification of the actual deliverables as organizations often have a relatively 
muddled idea about the precise characteristics of outcomes requested within the project they are 
about to start. Nevertheless, in order to test whether a more informative task description leads to 
more accurate estimates, we conduct a treatment in which a sample matrix is added to the task 
description. We find that a more detailed specification eliminates the estimation bias (in particular 
underestimation), which becomes almost zero when averaged across all subjects, resembling the 
“wisdom of the crowd” phenomenon (Galton, 1907). However, due to the extensive spread of 
individual estimates, the average estimation accuracy is not improved compared to the situation when 
only crude specification is provided, akin to the assumption of the “bias-variance trade-off” (Geman, 
Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992). The bias-variance trade-off implies that the absence of specific biasing 
intervention can induce high variance in estimates due to a large number of other environmental 
factors that can influence them. Hence, encouraging planners to utilize reliable historical information 
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and nudging them towards the reference class average appears to be a better strategy than relying 
on overly detailed project specifications.  
 
Previous literature suggests that planners may not be sensitive to the potential lack of relevant 
information during the estimation process. In line with this argument we show that subjective 
confidence in estimates is not a reliable predictor of estimation accuracy. Our subjects provided 
essentially identical confidence ratings irrespectively of what they knew about the task prior to the 
estimation. Our results suggest that project managers are better off by not making decisions regarding 
the adequacy of a project plan based on the confidence displayed by the project planners.  
 
One limitation of our study is that we focus solely on the estimation bias and (in)accuracy stemming 
from an incomplete project specification. However, misestimation of project duration can also be 
caused by a complex interplay of multiple other factors, such as risks and unpredictable events. These 
factors (especially the “unknown unknowns”) are often hardly foreseeable during the project planning 
phase but can induce potentially large schedule delays. Nevertheless, it is likely that the utilization of 
historical information in estimation can also ameliorate the effect of such factors, a conjecture 
worthwhile testing in future research.  
 
In our experiment, we have taken a conservative approach of creating weak interventions by providing 
only a single piece of additional information in each treatment, designed to pick up the lower bound 
of their effect on estimation bias and (in)accuracy. Remarkably, we observe that both minimal 
interventions successfully eliminate the underestimation bias. While our results are promising, we 
note that this area of research deserves more attention. It would be worthwhile to investigate 
additional enhancements of our interventions and test whether they further improve the estimation 
accuracy. For example, it would be interesting to explore whether the effectiveness of utilizing 
historical information can be strengthened by disclosing also the variance, quartiles or even the whole 
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distribution of outcomes in addition to the class average.  Future research could also shed light on the 
interaction between the estimation accuracy and experience, e.g., by giving subjects an opportunity 
to practice the task before the estimation. Furthermore, since a project is usually executed by more 
than one person and past research (Staats, Milkman, & Fox, 2012) shows that the underestimation of 
effort needed to deliver a project tends to increase with larger project team size, testing the 
effectiveness of historical information when team size is varied could be another natural extension of 
the current study.  
 
Another limitation is that in order to maintain control over the data generating process, we only use 
one task, identical across all subjects, making the selection of the reference class (the Baseline 
treatment) for extracting historical information straightforward. Since we find no differences in the 
actual task duration across treatments, the reference class was selected appropriately, and the 
historical information calculated from the reference class is a good predictor for individual outcomes 
of other subjects. Nevertheless, we believe it is worthwhile to investigate the effect of historical 
information also on complex business projects consisting of multiple tasks that are not identical. To 
consult historical averages in such environment, planners must first carefully select a meaningful 
reference class of past projects.  
 
In case the project is so unique that there is no prior undertaking to compare it to, or if the historical 
information from similar projects is unavailable, it might be helpful to assess the effect of providing 
information about the differences between the estimates and the actual duration from other projects. 
Acquiring historical information about related projects may be costly (e.g., because of search costs) 
and if planners do not consider the information valuable, they may be reluctant to seek it. In the 
current study, we elicit the willingness to pay for historical information ex-post and observe that 
subjects who have experienced the benefits of using such information value the information more. A 
deeper scientific inquiry into the process of reference class selection and a salient elicitation of 
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willingness to pay for historical information are other potentially interesting pathways for future 
research. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4: Linear regression analysis (Ordinary least squares regeression) 
 
(1) (2) (4) 
Dependent variable Estimate  Actual Duration  Absolute 
estimation error 
   
  
 
 
1. Info-After Treatment 323.63** -94.88 -252.81** 
 
(140.63) (131.26) (118.77) 
2. Info-Before Treatment 216.79* -124.96 -413.78*** 
 
(127.3) (124.76) (111.52) 
3. Detailed Description Treatment 586.68** -8.68 283.76 
 
(266) (146.65) (180.34) 
4. Age -5.54 5.46 -1.66 
 
(23.4) (19.59) (20) 
5. Female  -84.79 -88.01 15.81 
 
(153.07) (96.09) (111.24) 
6. Self-reported math skill  27.8 -188.03*** -69 
 
(79.59) (53.23) (50.27) 
7. Current degree of study 34.51 1.51 49.69 
 
(79.7) (41.54) (53.67) 
8. Employment status 52.91 -10.26 -68.47 
 
(68.78) (47.06) (52.44) 
9. Risk attitudes  45.22 28.89 -5.62 
 
(30.23) (26.61) (25.47) 
10. Time spent estimating -2.83 -1.73 -1.8 
 (2.37) (1.26) (1.53) 
11. Time spent indicating confidence in estimate 10.72 11.24 7.61 
 (15.37) (12.69) (10.99) 
12. Subjective confidence in estimate -243.00** 45.3 -26.8 
 (97.14) (77.81) (74.69) 
13. Estimate  0.12**  
  (0.06)  
Constant 1317.07** 206.68 661.64 
 (569.07) (646.97) (568.57) 
N 130 130 130 
R2 0.13 0.20 0.24 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, 
33 
 
Instructions 
(Note: used for Baseline, Info-After and Info-Before treatments) 
Thank you for coming. Please note that the use of watches, mobile phones, any other devices that 
show time and calculators is not allowed during this experiment. The experimenter will check the 
cubicles for the presence of time showing devices and calculators before the start of the experiment. 
Also, please note that from now on, until the end of the experiment, no talking or any other 
unauthorized communication is allowed. If you violate any of these rules, we will have to exclude you 
from the experiment and from all payments. If you have any questions after you finish reading the 
instructions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will approach you and answer your questions 
in private. 
Please read the following instructions carefully. The instructions will explain how you can earn money 
in this experiment. Your decisions and earnings will not be revealed to other participants. 
 
Task 
You will be shown 10 matrices one by one. Each matrix contains 16 numbers. Two of those numbers 
add up to exactly 100. You will have to identify those two numbers. You will move on to the next 
matrix only after you submit the correct answer.  
Before you start working on the task, you will be asked to estimate how long it will take you to 
complete it. That is, how long it will take you to provide correct answers for all 10 matrices. 
 
Earnings 
In this experiment, you can earn money based on the accuracy of your estimate and on your task 
performance. 
 
Estimation accuracy earnings  
Your estimation accuracy earnings (in AUD) will be calculated as follows: 
Estimation accuracy earnings = 18 −  0.04 ∗ |actual time in seconds − estimated time in seconds| ˟ ˟ If the formula returns a negative number, your estimation accuracy earnings will be set to 0. 
Your estimation accuracy earnings depend on the absolute difference between the actual time it takes 
you to complete the task and your estimated time. Notice that the more accurate your estimate is, 
the more money you earn 
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Task performance earnings  
Your task performance earnings (in AUD) will be calculated as follows: 
Task performance earnings = 300 ∗ (3 ∗ number of correct answers − number of incorrect answers)actual time in seconds    
Your task performance earnings depend on the actual time it takes you to complete the task and on 
the number of correct and incorrect answers you provide. Notice that the faster you complete the 
task (i.e. provide correct answers for all 10 matrices), the more money you earn. Also note that your 
earnings will be reduced for every incorrect answer you provide. 
 
Your total earnings 
Your total earnings from the experiment will be the sum of your estimation accuracy earnings and 
your task performance earnings.  
Notice that:  
• the more accurate your estimate is; 
• the faster you complete the task; 
• the fewer incorrect answers you provide; 
 
the more money you earn. 
 
 
When you finish 
After you complete the task, you will be asked to answer a few questions about the experiment. The 
final screen will display the summary of your earnings. When you finish the experiment, please stay 
quietly seated in your cubicle until the experimenter calls your cubicle number. You will then go to the 
room at the back of the laboratory to privately collect your experimental earnings in cash. You need 
to complete the entire experiment in order to get paid. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.  
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Instructions 
(note: used for the Detailed Description treatment) 
Thank you for coming. Please note that the use of watches, mobile phones, any other devices that 
show time and calculators is not allowed during this experiment. The experimenter will check the 
cubicles for the presence of time showing devices and calculators before the start of the experiment. 
Also, please note that from now on, until the end of the experiment, no talking or any other 
unauthorized communication is allowed. If you violate any of these rules, we will have to exclude you 
from the experiment and from all payments. If you have any questions after you finish reading the 
instructions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will approach you and answer your questions 
in private. 
Please read the following instructions carefully. The instructions will explain how you can earn money 
in this experiment. Your decisions and earnings will not be revealed to other participants. 
Task 
You will be shown 10 matrices one by one. Each matrix contains 16 numbers. Two of those numbers 
add up to exactly 100. You will have to identify those two numbers. You will move on to the next 
matrix only after you submit the correct answer.  
Before you start working on the task, you will be asked to estimate how long it will take you to 
complete it. That is, how long it will take you to provide correct answers for all 10 matrices. 
 
 
 
 
Correct answer for this sample matrix 
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Earnings 
In this experiment, you can earn money based on the accuracy of your estimate and on your task 
performance. 
Estimation accuracy earnings  
Your estimation accuracy earnings (in AUD) will be calculated as follows: Estimation accuracy earnings = 18 −  0.04 ∗ |actual time in seconds − estimated time in seconds| ˟ ˟ If the formula returns a negative number, your estimation accuracy earnings will be set to 0. 
Your estimation accuracy earnings depend on the absolute difference between the actual time it takes 
you to complete the task and your estimated time. Notice that the more accurate your estimate is, 
the more money you earn. 
Task performance earnings  
Your task performance earnings (in AUD) will be calculated as follows: 
Task performance earnings = 300 ∗ (3 ∗ number of correct answers − number of incorrect answers)actual time in seconds    
Your task performance earnings depend on the actual time it takes you to complete the task and on 
the number of correct and incorrect answers you provide. Notice that the faster you complete the 
task (i.e. provide correct answers for all 10 matrices), the more money you earn. Also note that your 
earnings will be reduced for every incorrect answer you provide. 
Your total earnings 
Your total earnings from the experiment will be the sum of your estimation accuracy earnings and 
your task performance earnings.  
Notice that:  
• the more accurate your estimate is; 
• the faster you complete the task; 
• the fewer incorrect answers you provide; 
the more money you earn. 
When you finish 
After you complete the task, you will be asked to answer a few questions about the experiment. The 
final screen will display the summary of your earnings. When you finish the experiment, please stay 
quietly seated in your cubicle until the experimenter calls your cubicle number. You will then go to the 
room at the back of the laboratory to privately collect your experimental earnings in cash. You need 
to complete the entire experiment in order to get paid. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.  
 
